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NOTES
STUDENT SYMPOSIUM ON JURISDICTION AND VENUE:
The place of trial of an action has great significance at all stages of
litigation, from service of process through execution of the judgment.
In this symposium, the writers examine and criticize developments in the
determinants of place of trial-jurisdictioi and venue-in state and
federal courts. The three notes are directed to differing aspects, pointing
out differences in policy as regards the treatment of corporations and in-
dividuals and even differences in policy between federal and state courts
in the treatment of corporations.
The first note criticizes the trend toward statutory and judicial ex-
pansion of jurisdiction in slate courts, pointing out adverse effects which
have not generally been recognized and offering a suggestion of a "best
jurisdiction" theory. The second note analyzes the dichotomy between
the concept of federal diversity jurisdiction and the requirement that
state law be applied by federal courts in diversity cases. The principal
question is whether the test of "outcome determination" requires that
state determinants of place of trial be applied in the federal courts, and,
if so, whether that application frustrates the utility of federal diversity
jurisdiction. In the last note the plight of the corporate plaintiff in fed-
eral diversity litigation is examined. The writer criticizes the position
that venue .may be laid only in the district corresponding to the Plaintiff's
state of incorporation, offering arguments for the more liberal "multi-
venue option!" permitting venue to be laid also in districts where the
plaintiff is licensed to do business or is doing business.
A RECONSIDERATION OF "LONG-ARM" JURISDICTION
The expansion of state court jurisdiction in recent years has been
discussed extensively in law review articles and comments.' Most of the
literature has been devoted to consideration of the probable and possible
limits of expansion under the requirement of due process of law,2 but
little attention has been given to the ultimate adverse results which may
1. The latest, most exhaustive treatment is Developments in the Lazo--State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909 (1960).
2. For example, fairness to the defendant is mentioned several times in Develop-
menits in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 1 at 934, 937, 955-65 and 1014
(1960). However, nowhere in this discussion is it pointed out that the weak plaintiff
and strong defendant may be reversed in some future action so that the person for whom
the laws were made might be unduly burdened by them.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
follow from the trend toward increasing a state's jurisdiction over non-
residents.' On the other hand, many valid arguments have been made
in support of jurisdictional expansion. Typical of these is the following :'
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce
between states, the need for jurisdiction over non-residents has
undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in
communications and transportation has made the defense of a
suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome.
A state certainly has an interest in providing its citizens with an
easily available forum in which to litigate claims at a minimum of ex-
pense. However, it should be remembered that the advantages gained by
a state in enacting liberal statutes for acquiring in personam jurisdiction
may be largely lost when other states follow suit. This is true because
the state no longer assures a convenient forum for all its citizens but only
for citizen plaintiffs, citizen defendants having become subject to the
"long arm" reach of other states' liberal statutes. It would seem that a
state's interest should extend to the protection of its citizens whether
plaintiffs or defendants.
One of the general results of state court jurisdictional expansion is
an increase in the number of forums available to plaintiffs in suits against
non-residents.5 With the increase in number of available forums comes
an encouragement of forum-shopping,6 which presents problems of over-
crowded courts, harassment of defendants and a two-step litigation
process. The two-step litigation process includes, first, a trial in the
forum state and, second, execution of the judgment in a foreign state.
If the defendant has property in the forum state, of course, the second
step is usually unnecessary.
Although the disadvantages of the two-step litigation process may
be outweighed in some cases by the location of witnesses and other means
3. The clearest recognition of the problem is in CHEATHAM, CONFLIcT OF LAWS,
CASES AND MATERIALS, 4th ed. at 7 (1961 Supp.) :
The expansion of jurisdiction of courts since the International Shoe Company
case has taken place principally in cases with relatively weak plaintiffs and
strong and wealthy defendants. Will these expanded grounds of jurisdiction be
sufficient when the nature of the parties is reversed with, say, a weak de-
fendant and a powerful plaintiff, or a powerful and potential defendant that
files in its own forum an action for a declaratory judgment against a weak
and distant claimant?
4. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
5. For example, a non-resident individual or corporate defendant may be sued for
a tort or on a contract in plaintiff's state if there has been a substantial connection with
the state, i.e., one doing business act; in the defendant's home state; in any state where
defendant may have property; in any state where defendant may be found; and in the
federal courts if the requisite jurisdictional amount is present.
6. See Ehrensweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Penioyer, 20 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
285, 290 (1958).
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of proof in the forum state, it would seem that the process obviates one
of the basic reasons for jurisdictional expansion-convenience of the
parties. The plaintiff must travel to a distant forum for execution of
his judgment. The defendant must either travel to a distant forum to
defend or suffer a default judgment. In some cases a defendant having
a valid defense on the merits may be required to default because he lacks
the funds for a defense in a distant forum of the plaintiff's choice. Pub-
lic policy is certainly not served in this instance.
The balance of convenience is difficult to strike. The forum for
trial should not be made more convenient for defendants than for plain-
tiffs. The question is thus raised as to whether the total relative con-
venience of the parties should determine the jurisdiction of the court.'
BACKGROUND OF STATE COURT JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over non-resident individuals and foreign corporations
has been an ever present problem in litigation. The present bases of
jurisdiction are the result of expansion from the "power theory"8 ex-
pressed in Pennoyer v. Neff' in 1877. For a court to have the power to
render a judgment in rem'0 it is necessary only for the property in contro-
7. It is interesting to note that in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where
all the parties and witnesses were in Florida except a trustee, the Supreme Court felt
that jurisdiction could not be determined by the "center of gravity." Florida was the
most convenient forum for the litigation. Compare Hanson v. Denckla, supra, with
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
S. The "power theory" of Pennoyer requires that there be property within the state
which the court may attach in order for the court to obtain jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant. Otherwise any judgment which the court might render would be
worthless. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The "power theory," as used in this
note, is somewhat broader than the Pennoyer concept. The theory may be generally ex-
plained as a limitation of a court's jurisdiction to cases where the court has the power
to enforce any judgment it may render. This same idea is expressed by the English
writer, A. V. Dicey in his General Principle No. 3 as "effective" jurisdiction. MORRIS,
DICEY'S CONFLICT OF LAWs 17 (7th ed. 1958). "An effective judgment means a decree
which the sovereign under whose authority it is delivered has in fact the power to enforce
against the person bound by it, and which therefore his courts can, if he chooses to give
them the necessary means, enforce against such person . . . ." DICEY AND KEITH, CON-
FLIT OF LAws 42 (3d ed. 1922). Dicey used this "principle of effectiveness" as an at-
tempt to explain when the English courts acquired jurisdiction over a cause. MORRIS,
supra at 17.
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10. In rem actions are those which settle controversies over specific property with-
in a court's jurisdiction and are binding on all the world. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS ch.
1, Introductory Note (1942). A major current problem involving in rem actions is the
determination of the situs of intangibles. The same problem is present in regard to
quasi-in-rem actions, as it is necessary to have the defendant's property in the forum
state for attachment purposes. This area of jurisdiction has retained the power con-
cept. For a discussion of situs of intangible property see, e. g., Andrews, Sitics of In-
tangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939) ; Develop-
ments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, note 1 supra at 950. The expansion of quasi-
in-rem actions in this note is used in the sense of methods available for a claimant to
pursue a personal remedy in his home state where the defendant has property or interests.
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versy to be within the geographical area served by the court. Similarly,
a judgment quasi in rem"' requires only that some property of the defend-
ant be within the geographical area served by the court. These concepts
have remained relatively stable since Pennoyer.
The basic requirement for rendering an in personam 2 judgment is
that the individual be found and served with process within the geograph-
ical area served by the court. This is the aspect of jurisdiction that has
been subject to expansion. It has been accomplished in part by statutes
permitting courts to obtain in personam jurisdiction over individuals and
corporations not present within the state under various nominal circum-
stances,"3 as long as the basic requirement of adequate notice is met. Ac-
companying the statutes has been a judicial willingness to depart from
the more rigid standard of the Pennoyer case.' 4
Early in United States history, there was a distinct difference in a
court's ability to obtain jurisdiction over corporations from that over
individuals because of the idea that a corporation had existence only in
its state of incorporation. 5 There are presently few differences in the
basi6 requirements for obtaining jurisdiction over individuals and cor-
porations, 6 except that provisions for service of process differ as a re-
sult of inherent differences between the two.'
Indiana specifically provides several bases for obtaining jurisdiction
over foreign corporations doing bisiness within the state. Such corpora-
tions must register with the Secretary of State and name an agent within
the state who is authorized to receive service of process before being
authorized to do business within the state.'" If a foreign corporation
does not register, it thereby consents to effective service of process on the
Secretary of State for any cause, of action which is connected directly or
11. Quasi-in-rem actions are those which settle controversies as to the rights and
duties of parties to particular property. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS ch. 1, Introductory
Note (1942).
12. In personam actions are those which s~ttle controversies between parties arising
out of contracts and torts and having no relationships with either real or personal prop-
erty. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS ch. 1, Introductory Note (1942).
13. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 262.04 (Supp. 1960).
14. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
15. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), which held
that a corporation's existence was limited to its state of incorporation; for a discussion
of developments in corporate status in states other than the state of incorporation, see
the accompanying note, Federal Venire and the Corporate Plaintiff.
16. See Ehrensweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 RocKY MT. L.
Rsv. 285, 287 (1958).
17. For example, only individuals get divorces and only corporations are subject to
the statutes requiring registration with the Secretary of State before being authorized
to do business within the state. Many of the provisions for service of process and ade-
quate notice, however, are the same or similar for foreign corporations and individuals
doing business 'within the state.
" "18.- INDn. ANN. STAT. § 25-306 (Burns 1960).
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indirectly with "any transaction" or the "doing of business" within the
state by the corporation.1 9 It has been held that the state has the power
to require that foreign corporations doing business in the state consent to
the service of process on a person within the state.2"
Other sections of the Indiana statutes provide for venue in any
county where the foreign corporation has assets of any kind, including
credits, 1 or in the case of injuries on railroads the action may be brought
wherever the line runs.22 Service of process may be made effectively on
the named agent, or, if none, the Secretary of State." If a foreign cor-
poration has property within the state, or the cause of action arose within
the state, notice by publication is sufficient when there is no agent with-
in the state to receive service.24 Where notice by publication is permitted,
personal service without the state is equivalent to publication if" supported
by proper affidavit.2"
A few states have enacted statutes which state additional grounds on
which foreign corporations and non-resident individuals may be brought
under the jurisdiction of the court. For example, Wisconsin enacted a
statute in 1959 which provides for in personam jurisdiction on very lib-
eral grounds.26 In addition the act provides for a liberal interpretation,
stating, "[T]he rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must
be strictly construed does not apply to this chapter. '12  This act.provides
for what may be described as long arm jurisdiction. It is in effect
"reaching" from Wisconsin into other states to obtain in personam juris-
diction over non-resident individuals and foreign corporations.
The expansion of jurisdiction which has taken place under the older
statutes, such as Indiana's, has becn accomplished by increasingly liberal
interpretation of the "doing business" and "any transaction" provisions.
The Attorney-General of Indiana wrote an opinion in which he stated
that an isolated real estate transaction involving real estate in Indiana
would make a foreign real estate brokerage corporation not admitted "to
do business in Indiana amenable tQ process.2" This follows ile reasoning
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-316 (Burns 1960).
20. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 164 Ind. 321, 73
N.E. 703 (1905).
21. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-708 (Burns 1946).
22. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-705 (Bums 1946).
23. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-804 (Burns 1946):
24. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-807 (Burns 1946).
25. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-808 (Burns 1946).
26. Wis. STAT. § 262.05 (Supp. 1960).
27. Wis. Stat. § 262.01 (Supp. 1960). This Wisconsin statute is what this note
calls a "long-arm" jurisdiction statute. The court may "reach" outside the state to ob-
tain jurisdiction over individuals or corporations.
28. 23 Ops. A Tr'Y GEN. 96 (1957). This is an interpretation of IND. ANN. STAT.§ 25-317 (Bums 1960).
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by the Supreme Court in McGee v. Interiwtional Life Insurance Co ., -1
which held that a single offer by a Texas corporation to reinsure a Cali-
fornia resident, followed by an acceptance of the offer by the California
resident was such a substantial connection with California as to give
California courts jurisdiction under the applicable statute.3" The offer
and acceptance were both by mail. McGee is the ultimate result of the
minimum contacts standard established by the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 Therefore the present law permits a
single act within a state to be a sufficient connection to bring it under the
requirement of "doing business."
There are other cases involving insurance contracts in which the acts
within the state obtaining jurisdiction over the foreign corporation were
very limited. 2 It is not certain whether jurisdiction could be similarly
obtained over a foreign corporation for a tort committed by its agent. If
the tort were in any way connected with the business of the corporation,
or "any transaction," it would seem to be no different from the contract
cases. 3 It is possible that a court might conclude that the tort itself was
sufficient to be a "transaction" so as to give the state court jurisdiction.
In the corresponding expansion of jurisdiction over non-resident in-
dividuals more distinctions have been made as to the type of action in-
volved. Generally an individual must be personally served within the
state to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.34 There are
several exceptions to this requirement similar to those providing for jur-
isdiction over foreign corporations.3" Similar to the provisions for cor-
29. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). For a thorough analysis of this case see Ehrensweig,
Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 RocKY MT. L. Rxv. 285 (1958).
30. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-1620 (1953).
31. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This case is thoroughly discussed in Note, 29 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 433 (1957). The minimum contacts standard as established by Mr. Chief Justice
Stone was that operations of the corporation within the state must establish "sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to en-
force the obligations which appellant has incurred there." 326 U.S. 310 at 320 (1945).
32. McClanahan v. Trans-America Ins. Co., 149 Cal. App.2d 171, 307 P.2d 1023
(Dist. Ct. App. 1957), upheld jurisdiction over a company whose sole act within the
forum state was retaining investigators and doctors for the case being tried there. Se-
curity Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Washington, 113 A.2d 749 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955),
upheld jurisdiction where one certificate was sent into the forum from a group policy
issued in another state. Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Acc. Ass'n, 229 F.2d
158 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956), upheld jurisdiction where the in-
sured took out a policy and subsequently moved into the forum state.
33. Cf. Interstate Dispatch, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 170 F. Supp. 170 (1958),
where it was held that a non-resident plaintiff could bring an action arising out of an
automobile accident in a county where one non-resident defendant had an office and
successfully bring in the rest of the defendants under IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1043 (Bums
1952).
34. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-707 (Bums 1946) ; Wis. STAT. § 262.06 (Supp. 1960).
35. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-703, 2-707, 2-807, 2-815 (Bums 1946); Wis. STAT.
§ 262.05 (Supp. 1960). The language of the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone in In-
338
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porations having property within the state, a non-resident who has prop-
erty within the state or who has a debtor within the state is subject to
attachment and garnishment for quasi in rem jurisdiction 36  In addition,
domicile is recognized as a basis for in personam jurisdiction, regardless
of the defendant's presence within the state." Domicile of one of the
two spouses, whether plaintiff or defendant, is sufficient to support juris-
diction in divorce actions," but the jurisdiction is not regarded as in per-
sonam. The increased ease of becoming a domiciliary in some states has
greatly increased the number of forums available for divorce actions.
Non-resident motorist statutes are universal as a means of obtaining
jurisdiction over individuals who have accidents while using the high-
ways of the forum state.39 It can be argued that such statutes would ap-
ply to corporations whose agents have an accident in a state where the
corporation has no other contacts. Other areas of jurisdictional expan-
sion include actions involving trespass to land4 and tax cases of sister
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), indicated that the "minimum
contacts" standard would also be applicable to individuals. For a discussion of the va-
lidity of this statement see Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, note 1
supra at 935-37. This is supported in Ehrensweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pen-
noyer, 30 RocKY MT. L. REV. 285, 287 (1958). However, Ehrensweig, supra at 292 states
that the Pennoyer case retains validity as regards individuals not doing business in a
foreign state while any action of a corporation in a foreign state would be a "doing
business" act. As regards individuals doing business in a foreign state through agents,
it was held as early as 1935 that constructive service of process was sufficient to obtain
in personam jurisdiction. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
36. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (dictum) (attachment) ; Harris v.
Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Altman v. Levine & Tany, Inc., 265 Minn. 48, 97 N.W.2d
460 (1959), held that an allegation of no funds due and owing from the garnishee to the
non-resident defendant did not defeat jurisdiction. The case is noted in 44 MINN. L. REV.
164 (1959).
37. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). This was first suggested in Mc-
Donald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (dictum).
38. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Bell v. Bell, 181
U.S. 175 (1901); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 666 (1949).
39. The first non-resident motorist statute upheld by the Supreme Court required
non-residents to file notice of consent to jurisdiction before being allowed to use the
highways. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). It was next held that consent to
jurisdiction was implied when a non-resident used the highways, since the state could
exclude the motorist altogether under its police power. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927). Query whether the police power of a state to regulate the public highways for
the public safety would permit total prohibition of the use. Compare Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). Indiana's non-resident motorist statute at first had the
defect of applying only to accidents which occurred on the highways. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 47-1028 (Burns 1952). This would not cover the situations where a motorist left the
highway and damaged property. A recent amendment has cured the defect in Indiana.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-808A (Burns Supp. 1961).
40. Minnesota first broke away from the common law rule that actions involving
trespass to land have to be tried where the land is located in Little v. Chicago, St. P.M.
& 0. Ry., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N.W. 846 (1896). Arkansas followed in Reasor-Hill Corp. v.
Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994 (1952). Mr. Chief Justice Marshall followed
the common law rule, but admitted that it was archaic and unreasonable because such an
action involved merely getting a money judgment, unless title to land was involved, in
Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811). While many
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states4' where the cause of action itself, rather than the land or property
involved, is now considered the subject matter of the action.
It is clear from the above that there has been a steady trend toward
jurisdictional expansion by state courts. With this, the differences be-
tween individuals and corporations have been almost completely obliter-
ated except in areas where there is an inherent difference.42
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION
The McGee Situation Reversed. It will be remembered that in each
of the extreme cases upholding jurisdiction, the plaintiff was an indi-
vidual" or a state44 and the defendant was either an insurance company
or other large corporation. Assuming that the McGee45 "substantial con-
nection" test is applicable to individuals as well as corporations,"8 it is pos-
sible that a large corporation or wealthy individual could obtain jurisdic-
tion over a weak non-resident defendant. There are presently some safe-
guards which might prevent this, but such prevention is not assured.
One's sense of justice may not be shocked by the result of the McGee case,
but it very likely would be shocked if the situation were reversed.
Assume that the facts in McGee were changed in that the Texas in-
surance company had paid the beneficiary's claim; that it was subse-
quently suspected that the California beneficiary had perpetrated a fraud
by failing to disclose that the insured had committed suicide; that the
Texas insurance company then brought an action in a Texas court to
recover the amount paid on the policy; and that Texas has a statute
providing for jurisdiction over non-residents under these circumstances.47
At this point, the California beneficiary is at a definite disadvantage.
The witnesses and means of proof are in California and it would be ex-
cessively expensive to defend the case in Texas. If he attempts to appear
specially in Texas to litigate the question of jurisdiction, the Texas courts
have held that any defects which might have been present in the court's
jurisdictions still follow the common law rule, it is not unlikely that Minnesota and
Arkansas will be followed by more states in the future. See Looper, Jurisdiction Over
Iinnovables: The Little Case Revisited After Sixty Years, 40 MINN. L. REv. 191 (1956).
41. Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 20, 25 (1959), states that there has
always been a hesitancy of state courts to entertain tax collection cases of sister states.
Although Delaware has followed this procedure as late as 1948 in Detroit v. Proctor, 5
Terry 193, 61 A.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1948), there is an indication that this policy is
becoming increasingly relaxed. See e.g., City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill.2d 297, 146
N.E.2d 61 (1958); Leflar, supra; 7 DEPAUL L. REv. 243 (1958).
42. See note 17 supra.
43. Supra note 29.
44. Supra note 31.
45. See text following note 29 supra.
46. See note 35 supra.
47. It could be argued that the insured had a substantial connection with Texas by
his acts of accepting the offer of insurance from Texas and mailing premiums to Texas.
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jurisdiction are thereby cured.4" If he suffers a default judgment in
Texas, he takes the great chance that the judgment will be executed suc-
cessfully in California. He may collaterally attack a Texas default
judgment in California on the issue of jurisdiction, but if he loses he has
thereby lost his chance of a successful defense on the merits. At the
present time it would seem unwise for a defendant to take a chance of
suffering a default judgment in a foreign forum if he has a good defense
on the merits. Although this result seems to place an unreasonable bur-
den on the defendant and defeats the purpose of jurisdictional expansion,
there seems to be no adequate safeguard against it.
The result would not seem quite so harsh in states which provide for
a special appearance.49 However, if the defendant should lose on the
jurisdictional point, he is then faced with a similar dilemma. He has had
his day in court and cannot thereafter attack the judgment collaterally on
the jurisdictional issueY If he then proceeds on the merits, which is
probably a hardship in the assumed case above, he may thereby waive
any possible direct attack on jurisdiction.' If he defaults on the merits
so as to save his objection on jurisdiction, he has lost his chance to pre-
sent any possible valid defensesY
Relationship of Adverse Effects and the Reasonable Expectations of
Defendants. It is logical that when insurance companies solicit and is-
sue policies in foreign states, they can reasonably expect that some dis-
putes will develop which will require litigation. Knowing this, they
should include such expected expenses in the premiums as a cost of do-
ing business. Especially in light of the McGee case,58 it is reasonable for
48. See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890), which held that the Revised Stat. of
Texas, Art. 1242-45 (1897), in converting any special appearance into a general ap-
pearance, did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution. The present law is found in TEX. R.P. Civ. 122, 123. The rule is dis-
cussed in Note, Non-Resident Defendants and the Special Appearance in Texras, 32 TEX.
L. Rav. 78 (1953).
49. IN¢D. ANN. STAT. § 2-1007 (Bums 1946), provides for demurrer if it appears on
the face of the complaint that the court has no jurisdiction of the defendant or the sub-
ject matter. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1011 (Burns 1946), provides for an answer if the de-
fect is not on the face of the complaint. Failure to demur or answer waives the issue
of jurisdiction over the defendant, but not over the subject matter.
50. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
51. See Associated Truck Lines v. Velthouse, 227 Ind. 139, 84 N.E.2d 54 (1949).
In the federal courts, FEn. R. Civ. P. 12 allows defendants to appear both specially and
generally.
52. It is possible that, as long as the defendant makes it abundantly clear that he
is preserving his objection as to jurisdiction, he may not lose or waive it by proceeding
to the merits.
53. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). It should also be remembered that in the insurance cases,
the "substantial connection" necessary to give a court jurisdiction has become very
slight. See Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.
1956), ccrt. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956), where the only connection with the state was a
policy holder who had moved into the state after receiving his policy in another state.
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insurance companies to expect to be subjected to litigation in foreign
states.
On the other hand, when an individual receives a policy of insurance,
he may reasonably expect that either the insurance company will pay as
required by the contract or that the matter can be litigated in a local
forum. If the individual should win in such a case there probably would
be no problem of having to execute the judgment, and the two-step litiga-
tion process would not develop. This result is desirable and places no
undue hardships on either side.
The idea of reasonable expectations is compatible with the doing
business test, and it is possible that this idea has been an important factor
in the expansion of jurisdiction although no court has expressed the
idea. 4 Any person doing business, entering into any transaction, or driv-
ing an automobile in a foreign state can reasonably expect that litigation
might arise in regard to any torts or contracts arising out of his conduct.
On this reasoning, it is not surprising that Vermont upheld jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant whose agents negligently damaged a plaintiff's
roof while in Vermont performing a contract."5
As contacts with a foreign state become more remote, however, it
seems that the courts may go beyond the reasonable expectation idea in
granting jurisdiction over non-residents. For example, it was pointed
out above that in the case of insurance contracts, the insurance company
is amenable to suit wherever the policy holder may ultimately move, re-
gardless of the fact that the company has no other contacts with that
state.5  It could be argued that this is a reasonable expectation for in-
surance companies, but how much farther can this reasoning be sustained?
The idea of reasonable expectations can be more clearly developed
when applied to other businesses and causes of action. A large automo-
bile manufacturing corporation which advertises, sells and generally has
substantial connections with all states could reasonably expect that its
products will be found in all states. The corporation could further rea-
sonably expect and plan for litigation in all the states involving causes of
action arising from the use of its products. The same would be true if
Can the position that an insurance company should reasonably expect this movement be
sustained? In the view of the fairly transient public in the United States today, per-
haps it can be.
54. North Carolina has a statute based in part on reasonable expectations of foreign
corporations. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (3) (1960). Its use has been limited. See
Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 235 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Putnam v. Tri-
angle Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957) (libel-unconstitutional on the
facts of this case only).
55. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
The court relied also on the convenience of the forum in upholding jurisdiction.
56. Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956).
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the manufacturer sold in only a large number of states but advertised in
all states. However, a small local manufacturer of machine parts in
Florida who advertises and sells within a limited area probably does not
reasonably expect that one of his parts might reach Alaska. On the other
hand, if the part were sold to an automobile manufacturer, it would be
reasonable to expect that the part might ultimately reach Alaska. The
question then arises as to whether on this basis, the local manufacturer
should reasonably expect to be amenable to suit in such a distant forum
for a warranty or negligence action.
It would seem that such a result would place an unreasonable burden
on one who is an otherwise small local businessman with no direct or
substantial connections with foreign states. Estimating the possibilities
of a suit in a distant forum would be an almost impossible task. The
task is admittedly lighter when the manufacturer knows that his products
will be widely distributed. However, the burden is still great for the
local manufacturer. This type of situation involving the possibility of
subjecting a weak defendant to the jurisdiction of a distant foreign
forum is another of the adverse effects which has apparently been over-
looked in the process of jurisdictional expansion."
It is questionable whether a manufacturer's reasonable expectation
of the ultimate destination of products should imply a reasonable expec-
tation of being amenable to suit in any such state for actions involving
these products. Because of the transient nature of the public today it
may be reasonable to expect any product to reach every state regardless
of the size of the manufacturer of that product. Fairness to the de-
fendant would seem to require some safeguard against "long arm" juris-
diction, which safeguard would take into consideration the type and size
of the defendant and his actual expectations of a product's destination.
The type of advertising, local or national, logically will vary with the
size of the manufacturer and probably is a good indication of the actual
expectations of the ultimate destination of his products. The actual ex-
pectations of a product's destination may be a valid basis from which a
reasonable expectation of suit can be inferred. On the above reasoning,
there should be a distinction between insurance companies and manufac-
turers when determining the ability of a court to obtain in personam
57. S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal dis-
missed per stipulation, 348 U.S. 983 (1955), held a corporation amenable to suit in a
foreign state where one of its alleged negligently constructed items was sold by an in-
dependent 'broker, the corporation itself having no direct sales system in the foreign
state. The manufacturer here did deliver the machine directly and had sent agents to
service it. The court evidently used this in determining that the doing business test was
satisfied. There was also mentioned the fact of reasonableness in the convenience of
the forum.
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jurisdiction over a non-resident. It is doubtful if this distinction is pres-
ently being made.
A distinction also should be made between manufacturers of indus-
trial products and manufacturers of consumer products. The former has
some control over his area of distribution and his expectations are more
easily determined. The latter has no control over where his products
may be taken by any consumer regardless of where sold. For these rea-
sons, it may not be fair for actual expectations of destination to be used
as a basis for inferring reasonable expectation of suit in a foreign forum
by a manufacturer who has no control over the ultimate destination, un-
less he intends for his products to reach every state and thus advertises
nationally.
The reasons for distinguishing between a manufacturer of industrial
products and a manufacturer of consumer products are even more applic-
able in distinguishing between a manufacturer and a retailer of consumer
goods. For example, a local independent service station attendant in
New York may sell tires which are guaranteed by a national nmanufac-
turer. Assuming that there is also an implied warranty for fitness for a
particular purpose against the retailer, a purchaser may have two chances
for recovering damages caused by a defective tire. This situation causes
no great problems for the most part. Most of a dealer's tire business is
with local residents, and under McGee there should be no difficulty ob-
taining jurisdiction over the manufacturer. However, if a California
resident replaces a worn tire at a New York station while on a trip, and a
defect in the tire causes an accident in Wisconsin, the California resident
may be able successfully to bring an action against the New York service
station operator in Wisconsin." One would clearly expect any such tire
sale to result in the tire moving from state to state. Since everyone is
presumed to know the law, it may be reasonable to expect that litigation
might take place in any state in regard to the tire. However, one prob-
ably would not reasonably expect to be subjected to an action for dam-
ages in some foreign state, and it would not seem fair to permit such a
result. Under present statutory and judicial standards for obtaining
jurisdiction, this result is possible."
While jurisdictional expansion of state courts has been the result of
58. The California resident would also be able to obtain jurisdiction over the manu-
facturer under McGee at this point, especially if doing business in the state where the
action is brought.
59. It may be argued under Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 229
F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956), that a sale to a non-resident,
gives the defendant seller a substantial connection with that state. Admittedly this goes
a step farther than the Schutt case as there were a least some mail contacts between the
two states in that case. This hypothetical fact siuation would seem to be expressly
covered by Wis. STAT. § 262.05(4) (b) (Supp. 1960).
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necessity to a large extent, it has developed to a point where the possible
detriment to defendants may outweigh the advantages to plaintiffs. If
the present safeguards are not sufficient to curb this in extreme cases,
some reform is necessary to insure justice in litigation in all cases. At
present, it seems that the plaintiff may have all the advantages including
the privilege of choosing from among several available forums, so that
his selection may be convenient to him regardless of the position in which
this places the defendant. Such a result would seem desirable only if it is
concluded before trial that all defendants are at fault and thus should be
penalized.
PRESENT SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ADVERSE EFFECTS OF "LONG-ARM"
JURISDICTION
The constitutional limitation on jurisdictional expansion is due pro-
cess as required by the fourteenth amendment. The relevant factors are
that the choice of the forum and the type of notice given the defendant
be such that he is assured of a fair trial. Adequate notice is not a major
problem. Most state statutes are such that actual, not merely construc-
tive, notice is given to the defendant."0 However, when a court has a
statutory ground for jurisdiction over an individual or corporation, no-
tice by means other than personal service has been upheld as not violative
of due process. For example, notice by publication has been held suf-
ficient service on a resident who was absent from his residence state.6 '
Service by registered mail on a foreign corporation with personal service
on a resident salesman was upheld in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
tolbnj and service by registered mail on a foreign corporation without any
accompanying personal service on an agent was deemed sufficient in
MllcGee v. International Life Isurance Co. 3 In a trust administration
case, service by mail on an inactive trustee was similarly upheld.64
The above cases indicate that the due process requirements other
than notice necessary to uphold jurisdiction over an individual or cor-
poration are uncertain. Usually the courts use such terms as "reason-
ableness," "fairness to the defendant," "freedom from undue hardships,"
60. Such statutes usually provide for notice to be served: (1) Personally if the
defendant is in the state; (2) By registered mail if the defendant is outside the state
and his address is known; or (3) By publication only if the defendant's address is un-
known after reasonable inquiry by the plaintiff and this fact is presented to the court
by affidavit. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-801-821 (Burns 1946) ; Wis. STAT. § 262.06
(Supp. 1960). See notes 23-25 supra, in regard to corporations. In all cases, the above
statutes provide for some proof that process was actually served.
61. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
62. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
63. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
64. Erdheim v. Mabee, 305 N.Y. 307, 113 N.E.2d 433 (1953). But see Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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and "assurance that substantial justice will be done." 5  An exact defini-
tion of what is unfair obviously cannot be given. Generally expenses of
travel, litigation and loss of earnings have not been considered an undue
haidship 6  The Supreme Court analyzes the due process requirements
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.," but this case points
out only the basic idea of reasonableness.
Under the test of reasonableness, there might very likely be several
courts which could obtain jurisdiction in most cases. Therefore, the test
of reasonableness does not sufficiently limit the number of forums avail-
able to plaintiffs. While this test might prevent obtaining jurisdiction
under many circumstances there is no assurance that this result will fol-
low. It is uncertain whether a court will take into consideration such
factors as wealth, business and reasonable expectations of suit in a
foreign forum."8
The doctrine of forum non conveniens can alleviate hardships to de-
fendants to whom the Constitution does not give adequate protection.
Basically the doctrine is "the discretionary power of a court to decline to
exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the cause before
it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere."0 9 While this doctrine in-
dicates a positive tendency toward limiting the number of forums avail-
able to plaintiffs, it is often ineffective in preventing hardships to de-
fendants." The fact that application of the doctrine is completely dis-
cretionary with the court takes vitality from its effectiveness. However,
when a court determines that the trial in some other forum will best
serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice and thereby
exercises its discretion under forum non conveniens, this exercise will
probably be upheld."'
Before a court will dismiss on forum non conveniens it will often
consider the policy reasons for the expansion of jurisdiction which has
taken place. Many courts may feel that the state's interest in providing
65. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
66. Cf. Altman v. Levine & Tany, Inc., 265 Minn. 48, 97 N.W.2d 460 (1959).
67. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
68. See Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Pro-
cess, 104 U. PA. L. Rxv. 381 (1955), where it is concluded that while there is a tendency
of expansion of due process requirements, the weighing of the relevant factors of rea-
sonableness makes due process uncertain.
69. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUm. L. Rav. 1 (1929).
70. See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 20, 24 (1959), where it is
stated: "Most courts take the view that despite their power to dismiss cases because
they can better be tried elsewhere, they will be very cautious in doing so, and will order
dismissal only in very clear cases."
71. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ; Koster v. American Lum-
bermen's Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (shareholders derivative action).
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residents with an inexpensive convenient forum will outweigh most of
the hardships of defendants.
It has been recently suggested that the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution could be used to limit jurisdiction of courts where an undue
burden on interstate commerce could be shown in subjecting a defendant
to litigation in a distant forum. 2  The commerce clause was used occa-
sionally for this purpose several years ago. 3 It has been used to a limited
extent recently by state courts.7" The Supreme Court has not recently
invoked it. It would seem that this would not be an effective method of
protecting individual defendants from undue hardships. In denying
jurisdiction because of an undue burden on interstate commerce, the rele-
vant interest is that of the public, not the individual defendant."
It has also been suggested that the best way to make certain when
jurisdiction will be obtained is to draft statutes in terms of different
types of actions."' This procedure is faced with obvious obstacles of ex-
treme complexity and difficulty in adequately covering all circumstances.
Also it is difficult for a statute to draw a definite line as to when obtain-
ing jurisdiction would present a case of undue hardship on a particular
defendant. It would seem that a statute listing in detail the situations in
which the hardship is sufficient would be impractical because of the
number of considerations necessary to determine hardships.
Wisconsin has approached the problem of personal jurisdiction by
a detailed statute. After indicating the circumstances upon which a state
court has jurisdiction over individuals,7" it has included sections provid-
ing for several safeguards."5 Where a defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is granted, the plaintiff is required to pay
defendant all reasonable costs thus far expended up to a maximum of
$500."M Another section provides that if a court "on motion of any party,
finds that trial of an action . . . should as a matter of substantial justice
be tried outside the state, the court may . . . stay further proceed-
ings. . . . "" This is completely discretionary on the part of the court
and there are various protective devices for the plaintiff to prevent his
72. Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 1 at 983-87.
73. E.g., Davis v. Farmer Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
74. E.g., Hershel Radio Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 334 Mich. 148, 54 N.W.2d 286
(1952).
75. See generally Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on In-
terstate Commerce, 17 MINN. L. REv. 381 (1933).
76. Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381 (1955).
77. Wis. STAT. § 262.05 (Supp. 1960).
78. Wis. STAT. §§ 262.19 and 262.20 (Supp. 1960).
79. Wis. STAT. § 262.20 (1) (Supp. 1960).
80. Wis. STAT. § 262.19 (1) (Supp. 1960).
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losing his cause of action when the court grants a stay.8 When a stay is
granted, the defendant may recover all his costs to date without limit.s2
-Since granting a stay is in the discretion of the court, it incorporates the
same weakness present in the doctrine of forum non conveniens. How-
ever, the penalties against plaintiffs would seem to prevent them from
bringing actions which have reasonable probabilities of being stayed. The
penalty for bringing an action where personal jurisdiction is not provided
by the statute has a similar cautionary effect.
The safeguards in the Wisconsin statute may be superficial. In the
first instance, the statute is sufficiently broad that there will be very few
cases where a Wisconsin resident cannot obtain jurisdiction over non-
residents. It can also be argued that the p-nalty against the plaintiff
when a stay is granted will make the courts even more reluctant to ex-
ercise their discretion to order a stay. As was pointed out above, a re-
viewing court will seldom disturb a trial court's decision where such dis-
cretion is involved.
POSSIBLE SOLUTION: A "BEST" JURISDICTION
Assuming that on the basis of the above arguments the present safe-
guards against jurisdictional expansion are not sufficient to insure justice
in manry instances, it would be desirable for some reform in jurisdictional
requirements.8  It would- be presumptuous to advocate any immediate
major reforms. The reasons advanced for the necessity of expansion of
jurisdiction are well grounded if not allowed to blind the courts to the
possible effects of going too far. However, a few minor reforms could
be initiated which could help insure justice in most cases.
It would seem that -the first step should be for courts and lawyers to
-think more in terms of one "best" jurisdiction out of the many available.
It is clear that the problem of personal jurisdiction has changed from in-
convenience on the part of plaintiffs because of limited available forums
to inconvenience on the part of defendants because of too many available
81. Wis. STXT. § 262.19 (1) (4) (Supp. 1960). The defendant must give his con-
sent to be sued in another forum; he waives the defense of the statute of limitations
which may have run since the plaintiff instituted the suit and the court retains jurisdic-
tion for 5 years in "the interests of justice."
'82. Wis. STAT. § 262.20 (2) (Supp. 1960).
83. It must be assumed that the present safeguards are insufficient for the pur-
p6ses of this note. It is certain that many people will feel that the expansion of juris-
diction will stop short of allowing a strong plaintiff to subject a weak defendant to a
distant forum, or of allowing an Alaskan motorist to subject a small Florida service
station salesman to an Alaskan forum on a breach or warranty action on a tire bought
in Florida. See New York Times v. Conner, 291 F.Zd 492 (5th Cir. 1961). But if this
is true in extreme cases, just where will the line be drawn? Is'it fair to determine
"fairness" of a forum on the basis'of the relative wealth of the parties? What about
the basis of "reasonable expectations" of suit without regard to wealth? It is submitted
that these are all relevant factors. t , g
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forums. It is not difficult to see that a median is needed which would
take into consideration the relative needs of litigants.
In choosing a "best" jurisdiction, the considerations relevant under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be seriously considered. In
this connection, Wisconsin has listed the following factors as relevant in
a court's determination of granting a stay :8"
(a) Amenability to personal jurisdiction in this state and in any
alternative forum of the parties to the action;
(b) Convenience to the parties and witnesses of trial in this
state and in any alternative forum;
(c) Differences in conflict of law rules applicable in this state
and in any alternative forum; or
(d) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the se-
lection of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.
"Other factors" could reasonably include the relative wealth of the parties
and therefore their relative hardships; the defendant's actual expectations
of possible suit in foreign forums; the location and type of real proof
necessary to the action and the type of action involved. Where, after a
consideration of the above factors, it is determined that there are two
equally fair forums, it would seem that the sensible solution would be to
revert to the "power theory."85  The "power theory" would prevent the
two-step litigation process. It would also seem a relevant factor in
weighing the relative merits of various available forums in the first in-
stance for this reason.
The different types of actions would require different analysis in
many cases. For example, the non-resident motorists' cases would usu-
ally warrant disregarding the "power theory." Since insurance com-
panies defend in most cases, there is no problcm of executing a judgment
and no need to bring the action in a forum where the defendant has
property. In the same case, more weight should be given to the location
of the accident for the convenience of witnesses and proof. However, in
a case where the non-resident motorist is not insured, the "power theory"
would become a very practical consideration because of the need for ex-
ecution of the judgment.
In the McGee case, a determination of the "best" jurisdiction prob-
ably would have resulted in allowing the plaintiff to bring the action in
California as was done. The plaintiff was relatively weak and the de-
84. Wis. STAT. § 262.19 (3) (Supp. 1960).
85. See note 8 supra; for further discussion of the power theory, see Ehrensweig,
The Transient Ride of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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fendant strong. It would not be an unreasonable burden on the defend-
ant to defend in California. The means of proof were in California.
The countervailing factor of the necessity of a two-step litigation process
for execution would be outweighed by the above factors. In the hypo-
thetical set out above in which the parties in McGee were reversed, the
same "best" jurisdiction would exist. By analyzing the relative burdens
on the parties and considering the elimination of the two-step litigation
process in the event the Texas Insurance Company won, California would
seem to be the "best" (or rather the better) of the two available juris-
dictions.
In the case of a local manufacturer or service station operator with
a distant injury caused by a defective product, it would seem that the
competing factors would be the location and proof and the problem of
execution. The facts in each case would have to determine which should
have the greater weight. In such a case, the other factors listed above
could probably solve the dilemma, giving substantial weight to the rea-
sonable expectations of suit by the seller.
It should be readily apparent that the idea of a "best" jurisdiction in
limiting the number of forums available to a plaintiff could do more than
limit jurisdictional expansion in protecting defendants. In some cases,
it might expand jurisdiction more in a particular area of the law. One
very important area which would seem to benefit from this is that of
trust and probate administration."6 In 1953 Erdheim v. Mabee7 followed
the prevalent idea of jurisdictional expansion. The case involved a will
probated in the District of Columbia creating a trust with a New York
bank as trustee and administrator and an inactive trustee in Wisconsin.
The plaintiff brought garnishment proceedings in New York to execute
an unsatisfied judgment for legal fees against the beneficiary. In hold-
ing for the plaintiff, the court reasoned that the appointment of a New
York trust company as trustee and administrator showed a presumptive
intent to remove the trust situs from the probate jurisdiction. Since the
Wisconsin trustee was inactive, he was not an indispensable party and
service by mail was considered sufficient for the court to obtain jurisdic-
tion and try the case.
This case was followed by Hanson v. Denckla,88 which seems to in-
dicate a trend away from expansion of jurisdiction."9 The Supreme
86. Compare Erdheim v. Mabee, 305 N.Y. 307, 113 N.E.2d 433 (1953) with Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
87. 305 N.Y. 307, 113 N.E.2d 433 (1953).
88. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
89. See Note, 31 RocKY MT. L. REv. 115 (1958), where it is pointed out that this
case draws an effective line between the strict rule of Pennwyer v. Neff and nationwide
service of process. But see Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 20, 27-35 (1959),
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Court held that a Florida court was without jurisdiction to decide the
validity of a power of appointment of a beneficiary of a trust previously
created in Delaware. The basic reason was the lack of jurisdiction over
the trustee, who was considered an indispensable party. Service by mail
was held insufficient to obtain jurisdiction of the absent trustee. As a
result, the validity of the subsequent Delaware decision"° upholding the
appointment made in Florida, and refusing to recognize as res judicata
the former Florida decision 1 denying validity, was upheld.
It seems unfortunate and impractical that an executor in state A
should not be able to discharge his duties in one "best" forum when the
testator dies in state B leaving a will in which he exercised a power of
appointment over a trust in state C and in which he provided for distri-
bution of property located in state D. A "best" jurisdiction could be
chosen so as to be most convenient to the majority of the parties, wit-
nesses and property involved." -2 Another important factor would be a
consideration of the conflict of law rules of the various jurisdictions.
The major problem facing the chosen court would be in the correct choice
of law for each part of the will. However, this would not be impossible
and it would seem much simpler and less expensive to the estate than hav-
ing the executor travel from state to state for separate judicial determina-
tions of the validity of the will. Such a solution, while apparently de-
sirable in cases such as Hanson, should be closely scrutinized on the facts
of each case. There may be fact situations where undue hardships would
be created by choosing only one forum. Also it must be admitted that
choosing one "best" jurisdiction would not prevent individuals from ig-
noring or challenging the determinations in their home states on the issue
of jurisdiction. However, these possible difficulties do not obviate the
necessity and desirability of limiting the available forums to a "best"
jurisdiction.
A "best" jurisdiction concept must provide for a time and place for
determination to be effective. Ideally, the party bringing the action
would consider all the relevant factors and institute his action in the right
court. The Wisconsin statutory scheme of penalizing plaintiffs who
chose the wrong forum seems a step in the right direction in encouraging
this practice. Another possibility would be the increased use of the "spe-
whre it is argued that this case is likely to be strictly limited to its facts in the future
and is therefore not indicative of a trend away from expansion.
90. Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819 (Del. 1957).
91. Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1956).
92. The decision in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), is surprising in this
regard in the light of the general tendency to expand rather than restrict jurisdiction.
The Court said that jurisdiction is not determined by the "center of gravity" of persons
affected.
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cial appearance" for the sole purpose of determining the "best" jurisdic-
tion. The special appearance has its greatest weakness in that the forum
chosen for determining a "best" jurisdiction may be unduly inconvenient
to one of the parties. However, it would necessitate only a trip by an
attorney-not all the witnesses and proof necessary for a full trial.
Another method which would tend toward the same result of obtain-
ing a "best" jurisdiction is wider use of forum non conveniens. This
necessitates the use of special appearances to litigate the question of juris-
diction, which most states other than Texas allow. The courts could do
this on their own initiative, or general statutes could be drafted requir-
ing that a court exercise its discretion to use forum non conveniens when
the facts of the particular case would justify it. While it would still be
difficult to question a trial court's discretion once exercised, a legislative
statement of policy such as this might encourage courts to give the mat-
ter more consideration. The effects of increased use of forum non con-
veniens would be two. Many hardships would be alleviated by its use
and the threat of its use would cause many attorneys to consider their
choice of forums more seriously in the first instance.
It could be argued that courts should return to the "power theory"
as the best jurisdiction. The additional relevant factors of relative con-
venience of parties, means of proof and a transient public would seem to
outweigh the advantages present in a strict application of the "power
theory." The theory probably can best serve the public interest when
considered by the courts as a relevant factor in determining a "best" jur-
isdiction, rather than the sole determinant.
ERIE V. TOMPKINS AND FEDERAL DETERMINANTS OF
PLACE OF TRIAL
Since 1938, when Erie v. Tomkins required that "except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any [diversity] case is the law of the state,"' the courts
have been attempting to determine the extent of that doctrine. The
question is, of course, how much law should be tied to the states? There
is, on the one hand, the consideration that if the federal court is made
absolutely identical to the state court nothing is gained by opening the
federal courts to what would otherwise be a state problem. On the other
hand, if there are significant differences in the federal courts, one may
1. 302 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
